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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Community Representatives 
Have Standing To Challenge FCC License 
Renewal-Office of Communication of 
United Church of Christ v. FCC* 
When the owners of a Jackson, Mississippi television station 
applied to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a 
renewal of their broadcast license, representatives of the local Negro 
community filed a petition with the Commission, requesting it to 
deny the renewal.1 Petitioners contended that a renewal of the appli-
cant's license would not be in the public interest since the station 
had consistently violated the Commission's "fairness doctrine" which 
requires broadcasters to encourage and implement a fair presenta-
tion of all sides of any controversial public issue discussed over their 
facilities.2 Specifically, petitioners alleged that, in its local programs 
dealing with racial integration, the licensee had presented only pro-
segregationist viewpoints.8 The Commission dismissed the petition 
without a hearing on the ground that petitioners had no standing 
to intervene in the licensing proceedings4 since they had failed to 
• 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
I. A joint petition was filed by the United Church of Christ of Jackson, Mississippi, 
Aaron Henry, President of the Mississippi National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, and Reverend Robert L. T. Smith, a leader of the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party. A second petition, filed by the Mississippi AFL-CIO 
alleging that the licensee's programming was heavily weighted in "opposition to 
organized labor, its leadership and objectives," was dismissed for want of any "sub-
stantial and material questions of fact." Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 
1153 (1965). All petitioners, with the exception of the Mississippi AFL-CIO, joined in the 
appeal of the Commission's memorandum opinion and order; Lamar Life Broadcasting 
Company participated as intervenor. 
2. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1250-51 (1949); see, e.g., 
Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 19 RADIO REG. 602, 605 (1960); FCC, Applicability 
of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 
29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964). In a 1959 amendment to the Communications Act, Congress 
affirmed the Commission's view that broadcasters should "afford reasonable oppor-
tunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 73 Stat. 
557 (1959), 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (1964). For an historical analysis and current evaluation 
of the "fairness doctrine,'' see generally Barron, The Federal Communications Com-
mission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1961). 
3. Racial integration may be a "controversial issue" within the purview of the "fair-
ness doctrine" when discussed on its merits in a program broadcast by a licensee. 
Lamar Life Ins. Co., 18 RAmo REG. 683 (1959). The violations alleged in the principal 
case were far from subtle. During Network programs which advocated racial integra-
tion, the licensee deliberately interrupted its transmission of the program with the 
sign "Sorry-Cable Trouble." In addition, strongly pro-segregationist programs were 
broadcast without any demonstrable effort to secure opposing views. Principal case 
at 998. 
4. The term "intervene" is used herein to refer broadly to any method by which a 
party may formally participate in a licensing proceeding before the FCC, including, 
at a minimum, the filing of a "petition to deny" a pending license application. See 
note 26 infra. 
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show that they would suffer "some injury of a tangible and substan-
tial nature" from the administrative action in question.5 The Com-
mission, however, did consider petitioners' allegations as an "infor-
mal objection" to the renewal application, and, as a result, granted 
a license renewal for only one year, instead of the usual three.6 Fur-
ther, it conditioned subsequent renewals on the licensee's making 
"demonstrable efforts" to meet the needs of the local Negro com-
munity as well as adhering strictly to the standards of the "fairness 
doctrine."7 On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals, held, reversed. Petitioner's allegations must be considered 
in an evidentiary hearing on the renewal application because: (I) 
petitioners had standing to challenge the license renewal since they 
were responsible representatives of the listening community whose 
participation in the proceeding was necessary in order to provide an 
effective means for the Commission appraisal of the licensee's perfor-
mance of its duty to operate in the public interest; and (2) the Com-
mission had failed to support adequately its finding that renewal of 
the license without a hearing would be in the public interest. 
The Federal Communications Act of 1934 charges the FCC with 
the responsibility of assuring that the "public interest, convenience 
and necessity" will be served by any exercise of its authority to grant 
or renew a broadcasting license.8 To assure full and adequate atten-
tion by the FCC to considerations involving the public interest, the 
Act authorizes any "party in interest" to question the propriety of 
the grant or renewal of a license by filing with the Commission 
either a "petition to deny" the pending license application if the 
Commission has not set a date for a hearing on the application9 or a 
"petition for intervention" in the licensing proceeding if a hearing 
has been set.1° Furthermore, if a "petition to deny" is filed, the Act 
requires that there be a hearing on the application if the petition 
raises a substantial question of fact as to whether the grant of the 
application would be in the public interest11 or if "for any reason" 
the Commission is unable to make a finding that the grant would 
be consistent with the public interest.12 If the Commission dismisses 
a "petition to deny" and grants the license without a hearing, con-
5. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1149 n.11 (1965); accord, Northern 
Pac. Radio Corp., 23 RADIO REG. 186, 189 (1962); Gordon Broadcasting, 22 RADIO REc. 
236 (1961). 
6. Section 307(d) of the Communications Act, as amended, 74 Stat. 889 (1960), 47 
U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964), authorizes renewals for less than three years at the discretion 
of the Commission. 
7. See generally Note, 33 GEO. WASH. L. R.Ev. 764 (1964) (discussing scope of Com-
mission authority to grant conditional licenses). 
8. 74 Stat. 889 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964). 
9. 74 Stat. 890 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(l) (1964). 
10. 78 Stat. 193 (1964), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). 
11. 74 Stat. 891 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2) (1964). 
12, 78 Stat. 193 (1964), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). 
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sideration of the petition is adjudicatory in nature,13 and the 
grounds for the Commission's actions must be set forth in a separate 
memorandum.14 This furnishes a basis for immediate judicial re-
view and a possible stay of the Commission's order pending dispo-
sition of the appeal.15 An appeal may be made by any party "ag-
grieved" by the Commission's order,16 and the courts and the Com-
mission have assumed that a "party in interest" whose petition has 
been denied is an "aggrieved party."17 
The FCC has narrowly construed the term "party in interest," 
so as to include only (I) licensees alleging present or potential elec-
trical interference from an applicant, and (2) parties, including li-
censees, who can show that they would suffer direct and substantial 
economic injury from the granting of an application.18 Prior to the 
decision in the principal case, the courts had apparently given at 
least tacit approval to this construction, for in no instance had 
standing to contest a licensing order been upheld on any other 
ground,19 although no case specifically denied that other grounds 
13. See Administrative Procedure Act § 2(d), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 
U.S.C. § lOOl(d) (1964). In considering the merits of a "petition to deny," the Com-
mission is guided by "rules applicable to a motion for summary judgment." See S. REP. 
No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959). 
14. S. REP. No. 690, supra note 13, at 4. See also FCC Rules §§ 1.561, 47 C.F.R. 
§ 1.561 (1966); l.580(i), (j), 47 C.F.R. §§ l.580(i), (j) (1966); l.59l(c), 47 C.F.R. § l.59l(c) 
(1966). 
15. See H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960). 
16. 66 Stat. 719 (1952), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1964). 
17. See Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); 
Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Camden 
Radio Inc. v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
18. See, e.g., Arkansas Radio &: Equip. Co., 6 RADIO REG. 2d 734 (1966) (citi-
zens' committee); Loyola Univ., 24 RADIO REG. 766 (1962) (labor union); Northern Pac. 
Radio Corp., 23 RADIO REG. 186 (1962) (individual members of the public; judgment 
creditor of licensee); Evansville Television, Inc., 16 RADIO REG. 257 (1957) (local 
Chamber of Commerce); Kansas State College, 8 RADIO REG. 261 (1952) (association of 
radio and television broadcasters); Capital Broadcasting Co., 8 RADIO REG. 229 (1952) 
(group of local transit riders); E. D. Rivers, Jr., 6 RADIO REG. 552 (1950) (unincorpo-
rated association of licensees). 
19. The term "party in interest" was not defined in the 1960 legislation which 
created the "petition to deny." However, in a 1952 revision of the protest procedure 
then in force, Congress indicated that interpretation of the term "party in interest" 
was to be governed by the criteria which had been applied in defining a "person 
aggrieved" under § 402(b). See S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951) (The House 
Report, H.R. REP. No. 1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10-11 (1952), omitted any definition 
of "party in interest'). Although the courts have never construed the term "person 
aggrieved" as necessarily restricting judicial review to persons showing a likelihood 
of economic injury, standing under § 402(b) has never been granted on any other 
grounds. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); South• 
western Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Elm City Broadcasting 
Corp. v. United States, 235 F.2d 8ll, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Metropolitan Television 
Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1955); National Broadcasting Co., KOA 
v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), afj'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943); Yankee Network, Inc., 
v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1939); cf. National Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. FCC, 
January 1967] Recent Developments 521 
may exist.20 The principal case is the first to test whether a member 
of a licensee's audience has standing to compel an evidentiary hear-
ing on its renewal application without having shown a direct eco-
nomic or technical interest in the proceeding. 
Although the Commission's restrictive interpretation of a "party 
in interest" is probably designed to prevent it from peing overbur• 
dened by a "host" of frivolous protests,21 it does impose significant 
limitations on the availability of review of a Commission determina-
tion that a licensee has met or is meeting its obligations to present 
its programs in accord with the public interest. In the principal case, 
for example, the licensee was charged with repeated violations of 
the Commission's "fairness doctrine," adherence to which is con-
sidered an essential element of operating in the public interest.22 
Since violations of the "fairness doctrine" cannot normally be dis• 
covered by the Commission's own investigative machinery,28 reliance 
is necessarily placed on public protest to reveal conduct which might 
be deemed violative of the public interest standard.24 However, the 
2!14 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (writ of mandamus ordering FCC to conduct hearing 
or revoke license of broadcaster denied). See generally Note, 55 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 209 
(1955). 
20. The courts had held, however, that when a petitioner has alleged economic 
injury as a basis for standing as a "party in interest," but fails to demonstrate a 
sufficient economic injury, such a petitioner does not have standing. See, e.g., South-
western Publishing Co. v. FCC, supra note 19, at 8!13. 
21. See Brief for Appellee, pp. !15-!17; S. REP. No. 44, supra note 19, at 8. 
22. FCC, supra note 2, at 1258; principal case at 1007. 
2!1. The FCC relies upon three sources of information for measuring adherence to its 
regulations with respect to program content. First, the Commission checks content by 
comparison of the licensee's proposed programming (at the time of grant or last 
renewal) with that actually presented, determined on the basis of a random selection or 
sampling of the station's program logs. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.6; 73.112(c){!I), .116 (1966). 
This procedure, however, is capable only of measuring "program balance" (the per-
centage of time devoted to entertainment versus, for example, news, religious, educa-
tional or "public service" programs) and is not sufficiently detailed to reveal whether 
there has been a fair presentation of all sides of a controversial issue discussed on a 
given program. See generally FCC, Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 
7295-96 (1960). See also The Tribune Co., 9 R.AD1O REG. 719, 752-60 (1954), aff'd sub 
nom. Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 2!10 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
Second, the Commission makes use of field monitoring, aural or visual, of programs 
broadcast by licensees. Information obtained from this source is likewise inadequate to 
disclose lack of adherence to the "fairness doctrine." 
Third, the Commission relies on information supplied from public protests and 
complaints. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.81 (1966). See generally FCC 30TH ANNUAL REPORT 51 
(1964); FCC 26TH ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1960). 
Inherent in both program log analysis and field monitoring studies is the difficulty 
that a broadcaster may have complied with the requirements of the "fairness doctrine" 
in making a "good faith," though unsuccessful, effort to secure presentation of an op-
posing view. Absolute adherence to the "fairness principle" may thus be frustrated by 
the public itself where spokesmen for opposing views refuse to come forward. Neither 
procedural check employed by the Commission would disclose this difficulty, with the 
result that the Commission would have to resort to further, though futile, investigation. 
24. The Commission itself has acknowledged this reliance: 
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failure of a broadcast station to present fairly all sides of a contro-
versial issue can, at best, result in only indirect economic injury to 
proponents of excluded viewpoints,25 so that many persons contest-
ing license renewals because of alleged "fairness doctrine" violations 
would be denied standing were the Commission's restrictive con-
struction upheld.26 Without standing to present a formal "petition 
to deny," a complainant's only alternative is to present his argu-
ments by an "informal objection" to the pending application.27 As 
a means of providing the Commission with information concerning 
improper operations, the "informal objection" procedure is theoreti-
cally as adequate as the "petition to deny," for the Commission may 
order an evidentiary hearing on the basis of the objection, and the 
complaining parties may be requested to appear and present evi-
dence of the alleged misconduct.28 However, as a means of assuring 
There are over 5,000 broadcast stations in operation. The Commission, obvi-
ously, can make independent inquiry into the service of only a few of these. 
Indeed, unless there is some reason to do so no ancillary investigation is usually 
made to determine the extent to which or manner in which a licensee has dis· 
charged his responsibility. It is to the public that the Commission must look for 
much of the information useful in evaluating community broadcast service. 
This is especially true with regard to license renewal. 
H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 218 (1962). 
25. An exception might arise where the advocates of one side of a given controver-
sial public issue have an economic interest of their own at stake in the issue's outcome. 
For example, a group of property owners favoring urban renewal of land adjacent to 
their own property might well be economically injured in the event that an influential 
local broadcaster carried only programs opposing the project, which eventually in-
fluenced its defeat. 
26. The principal case appears to have been the first dealing with the question of 
standing of persons protesting license renewal on the grounds of past violations of the 
"fairness doctrine." 
Standing to be heard does not, however, automatically give a petitioner the right 
to appear before the Commission in an evidentiary hearing. Initially, it is significant 
only in that (1) the Commission must give formal consideration to the petitioner's 
allegations (in its "petition to deny'), and (2) such consideration is adjudicatory in 
nature, so that an appeal may be prosecuted from an adverse determination by the 
Commission. It is only when the allegations present "a substantial and material 
question of fact" as to whether a renewal would be consistent with the demands of 
the public interest that the application must be designated for a hearing in which 
the "parties in interest" may appear. 
27. See FCC Rule 1.587, 47 C.F.R. § 1.587 (1966). When the Commission concludes 
that a petitioner has not demonstrated that it qualifies as a "party in interest," (or, 
where petitioner may be a "party in interest" but has failed to raise an issue as to 
whether a grant of the application would be in the public interest) the Commission 
may treat the petition as an "informal objection" to the license application, under 
§ 1.587 of its Rules and Regulations. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1153 
(1965). 
28. [I]n the event a hearing is ordered, if a person not a "party in interest" to a 
proceeding feels that he has information which might assist the Commission in 
the determination of any pending matters, he may request intervention. 47 CFR 
l.223(b) or appear and give evidence as a public witness, 47 CFR 1.225. And he 
will not be precluded from giving any relevant, material, and competent testi-
~ony because he lacks a sufficient interest to justify his intervention as a party 
m the matter. 
Brief for Appellee, p. 39. 
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adequate protection to the public, an "informal objection" is sub-
stantially less desirable than a formal "petition to deny." Although 
the Commission professes to apply the same standards in determin-
ing whether an "informal objection" necessitates an evidentiary 
hearing as it does in evaluating a formal "petition to deny,"29 it can 
dismiss the "informal objection" without an opinion,30 so that 
it is impossible to ascertain not only what significance the Com-
mission attached to the allegations in the "informal objection," 
but whether any consideration was given to them at all. Thus, un-
less a petitioner has the standing necessary to require the Commis-
sion to render an opinion discussing its resolution of the allegations, 
there is no basis for judicial review of an actual failure or refusal of 
the Commission to act on meritorious objections. This may frustrate 
attempts by the public to secure a full examination of a licensee's 
allegedly improper programming and may even discourage public 
protest in the first instance.31 
In the principal case, the court recognized that public opinion is 
an essential factor to be considered in the assessment of a licensee's 
performance and that an effective expression of such opinion has been 
largely precluded by the Commission's restrictive interpretation of 
standing.32 Moreover, the court rejected the Commission's conten-
tion that Congress intended to make electrical interference and 
economic injury the exclusive bases for standing,33 since it found 
in the congressional reports recognition "that the issue of standing 
was to be left to the courts."34 The court regarded standing as 
basically a "practical and functional concept," designed to insure 
the genuineness and legitimacy of the interests of those seeking to 
participate in a license renewal proceeding,35 and it felt that the 
legitimacy of these interests could be adequately assured if standing 
were limited to "responsible and representative" members of the 
listening community.36 By liberalizing the criteria for standing, the 
29. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 39-40, 55. 
30. See NBC v. FCC, 7 RADIO REG. 2d 2067, 2078 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Letter From Ben F. 
Waple, Secretary, FCC, to the Michigan Law Review, Feb. 28, 1966. However, if in 
the Commission's view, the objection raises a "substantial and material question of 
fact" as to whether the issuance of a license to the applicant will be in the public 
interest, the FCC theoretically should resort to an evidentiary hearing on the ques-
tions presented before acting finally on the application. See 78 Stat. 193 (1964), 47 
U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). 
31. See Brief for Appellants, p. 23. 
32. See principal case at 1005. 
33. Id. at 1000-01. 
34. Id. at 1002. 
35. Ibid. 
36, Id. at 1005. It is not clear, however, that Congress intended to encourage public 
protest. Indeed, the legislative history reveals at least some sympathy for the Com-
mission's concern that an overly broad standard for public intervention at the ad-
ministrative level might inundate the agency with frivolous protests. Nonetheless, 
no attempt was made to specify who could intervene beyond the broad category of 
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court in the principal case has significantly improved the ability of 
members of a licensee's audience to challenge the propriety of the 
license renewal. Furthermore, it has increased the number of cases 
in which the Commission must, in a formal memorandum, justify 
its granting of a renewal despite public complaints of past program-
ming misconduct. Although an added burden is thereby placed 
upon the Commission, an important step has been taken to insure 
that the interests of the public are reflected in a licensee's program-
ming. 
The court's opinion, however, does present several problems, 
perhaps the most serious of which stems from the approach it used 
in concluding that the short-term renewal of the license was "erro-
neous."37 The court found that petitioners' allegations of program-
ming misconduct, if proved, would "preclude, as a matter of law, the 
required finding that renewal of the license would serve the public 
interest."38 In addition, in concluding that the Commission's opinion 
did not adequately support its finding that the public interest would 
be served by a renewal,39 the court implicitly rejected the Commis-
sion's "policy determination" that the one-year license renewal was 
justified by the special needs of the licensee's community and the 
licensee's specific assurance that its future programming would ful-
fill the demands of the "fairness doctrine" ;40 indeed, the court sug-
gested alternative considerations which it thought the Commission's 
opinion should have reflected.41 Thus, the court's opinion can be 
read as suggesting to the Commission the result it should have 
reached on the merits. The propriety of such an approach would 
certainly be questionable, since policy determinations are clearly 
within the exclusive scope of the Commission's expertise.42 How-
ever, the Federal Communications Act does provide a basis by 
"party in interest," and the very presence of the intervention provisions reveals a 
Congressional intent to admit relevant and responsible public opinion. See note 18 
supra and accompanying text. 
37. Principal case at 1009. 
38. Id. at 1008-09. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Id. at 1008. 
41. [T]here are other reasons why one station in Jackson might be better than 
two for an interim period. For instance, ••• Appellant Smith alleged that the 
other .•• station in Jackson had agreed to sell him time only if WLBT did so. 
It is arguable that the pressures on the other station might be reduced if WLBT 
were in other hands-or off the air. The need which the Commission thought 
urgent might well be satisfied by refusing to renew the license of WLBT and 
opening the channel to new applicants • • • on the theory that another, and 
better suited, operator could be found to broadcast ••• with brief, if any, inter-
ruption of service. 
Id. at 1009. 
42. See FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946); Federal Radio Comm'n v. 
Nelson Bros. Bond &: Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276-77 (1933); cf. FCC v. Pottsville 
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38, 144-45 (1940). Compare FCC v. RCA Com-
munications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90-91, 94 (1953). 
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which the court's holding may be supported. Section 309(e) of the 
Act provides that a hearing must be held on an application for 
renewal unless the Commission can make an affirmative "finding" 
that the renewal would serve the public interest.43 In order to de-
termine whether the Commission adequately supported its "find-
ing," however, the court must necessarily consider the sufficiency 
of the factors upon which the Commission relied. Thus, if the 
language of the court in the principal case can be construed as 
simply a statement that the evidence upon which the Commission 
relied was inadequate to support its "finding," the court's decision 
may be viewed as a traditional exercise of judicial review.44 So 
construed, the court's comment that "a history of programming 
misconduct of the kind alleged [largely "fairness doctrine" viola-
tions] would preclude, as a matter of law, the required finding that 
renewal of the license would serve the public interest"45 may be 
read as essentially dictum. Yet, even if the language is dictum, the 
court is apparently indicating that it believes that the Commission 
should give greater weight to "fairness doctrine" violations, rather 
than viewing them, as it has in the past, as simply one fact to be 
considered in determining whether the licensee has been operating 
in the public interest. In thus urging greater regulation of program 
content, the court may have placed the Commission in a difficult 
position, for although some governmental regulation of program 
content may be a justifiable incident of the Commission's statutory 
mandate,46 increased restraints imposed upon the licensee's freedom 
43. 74 Stat. 891 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2) (1964); cf. 78 Stat. 193 (1964), 47 
U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964). It is not entirely clear, however, whether the language of the 
statute was intended to require the Commission to include, in its memorandum 
dealing with the allegations of a "petition to deny," an express justification of its 
"finding" that renewal would be in the public interest. Indeed, the legislative history 
suggests the contrary: 
The Commission would not be required to write an opinion in support of the 
grant as in a hearing case, but would [only] be required to dispose of each sub-
stantial question presented by the petitioner •••• 
S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1959). 
44. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437, 444-45 (D.C. Cir. 
1949); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
The distinction between fact and law is vital to a correct appreciation of the 
respective roles of the administrative and the judiciary. The administrative is 
the sole fact finder. The judiciary may set aside a finding of fact not adequately 
supported by the record, but, with certain exceptions its function is at that point 
exhausted. It has, as it were, a veto but no positive power of determination. 
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546 (1965). 
45. Principal case at 1007. 
46. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 
(1943); Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Communications Act spe-
cifically provides for some regulation of program content. Section 315 of the Act 
requires that a licensee "afford equal opportunities to all • . • candidates for [a 
particular] office • • ." if the licensee has permitted one candidate to broadcast. 
48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964). The same section also pro-
scribes censorship by the licensee of any such political material. See generally Note, 
Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HA.Rv. L. REv. 701 (1964). 
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of expression raise serious first amendment questions.4-7 Indeed, the 
validity of the restraints imposed by strict enforcement of the "fair-
ness doctrine" is now being considered by both the courts48 and the 
Congress.49 
A second difficulty with the court's reasoning in the principal 
case arises from its reliance upon "responsibility" and "representa-
tiveness" as the primary criteria for determining standing to inter-
vene. While the FCC should, by use of its statutory rulemaking 
power, define these terms, 50 the court has suggested the construction 
it would employ, and this construction is quite restrictive. In the 
court's view, to be "representative," a petitioner should: (1) have 
"significant roots in the listening community"; (2) concern itself 
with "a wide range of community problems"; and (3) reflect the 
"broad as distinguished from narrow interests, public as distin-
guished from private or commercial interests."51 The petitioners 
in the principal case could certainly be described as "representa-
tive" of interests which are not only "broad," but are even "na-
tional" in scope. However, the application of the court's criteria 
would exclude spokesmen for private or otherwise "narrow" inter-
ests who should not necessarily be denied standing. Consider, for 
example, representatives of a small group of Puerto Rican citizens 
who have recently arrived in an ethnically homogenous community 
from which Puerto Ricans have traditionally been excluded. They 
would clearly be denied standing to protest biased programming 
under the criteria suggested by the court, for such a group would 
not have "significant roots" in the community, could not be con-
sidered "representative of broad as opposed to narrow interests" of 
the community,52 and would probably not have become "interested 
in a wide range of community problems." However, the interests 
and views of a minority group such as this are those which might 
well be excluded from programs dealing with controversial issues 
on which the community's ethnic majority takes a contrary posi-
tion. Since the public interest seemingly requires the expression of 
more than simply the views and interests of the majority,53 the 
47. American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, ll0 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 
1953), afj'd, 347 U.S. 495 (1954); Note, 77 HAR.v. L. REv. 701, 713-14 (1964); cf. Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
48. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, No. 2331-65 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
49. See Broadcasting, Oct. 31, 1966, p. 9, reporting the preparation of question-
naires to solicit comments from broadcasters regarding the "fairness doctrine.'' The 
"study conducted by the [Senate Communications] subcommittee ••. has been in 
works for months ••• [the results of which] will be used to judge whether new legis-
lation is required • • .'' in the area. Ibid. 
50. Principal case at 1005-06. 
51. Id. at 1005. 
52. This would be the case, unless the court is prepared to assume the role of 
arbiter of what "should" constitute the "true" interests of the community. 
53. See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248, 1249 (1949); Trin-
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Commission should not only permit representatives of all minority 
interests affected by violations of the "fairness doctrine" to bring 
such violations to its attention, but it should be required to take 
such alleged violations into consideration in its licensing order. 
In contrast to its explication of "representative," the court offers 
no definition of the term "responsible." In one sense, the meaning 
is obvious: to be permitted to have access to the licensing process, 
a petitioner should be reliable and sincere in its contention. How-
ever, it is unclear whether the court thought that "responsibility" 
requires that a party assert a claim which is actually related to its 
own interests.54 In the principal case, representatives of the Negro 
community asserted a claim directly related to their own interest: 
improper treatment of the issue of racial integration. Yet the 
NAACP would not and probably should not be considered "respon-
sible" if it had asserted a claim that, in a program discussing new 
methods of surgery, the licensee had improperly excluded the pre-
sentation of a controversial surgical technique. In other words, it 
would be reasonable for the courts to measure the "responsibility" 
of a petitioner not only by reference to his status in the community, 
but also with regard to his relation to the claim asserted. Indeed, 
such a correlation may often be essential to the maintenance of a 
reasonable degree of expertise and an informed discussion in a hear-
ing on a licensee's alleged misconduct. Admittedly, it may not be easy 
to draw the line in every instance; for example, consider whether 
the NAACP is a "responsible" representative of an anti-military 
intervention position in a discussion of the foreign policy of the 
United States. 
Finally, in treating the question of standing, the court followed 
the lead of the Commission in assuming that every "party in inter-
est" who has standing to intervene at the administrative level would 
have standing to appeal from an adverse Commission decision as a 
"party aggrieved."55 The court's expansion of the criteria for stand-
ing as a "party in interest" would thus be applicable in a deter-
mination of standing to appeal.56 Such an assumption may be un-
warranted, for "there is no logically necessary relationship between 
the right to an administrative hearing and a right to appeal."57 It 
ity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broadcasting 
Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). 
54. The court pointed out, principal case at 1006, that "the usefulness of any 
particular petitioner for intervention must be judged in relation to other petitioners 
and the nature of the claims it asserts as basis for standing." (Emphasis added.) At 
the same time, however, the court appeared to accept the possibility that a group 
might be responsible and representative without being interested exclusively in the 
claim it asserts. Id. at 1005. 
55. Id. at 1000 n.8. 
56. See id. at 1007 n.25. 
57. JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 524. 
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has been suggested that Congress intended the standing require-
ments for a "party in interest" and for a party "aggrieved" to be 
determined by similar criteria.58 The legislative history, however, 
is not conclusive, and it has been argued with equal conviction that 
Congress intended that the established criteria for standing to seek 
judicial review be, at most, exemplary of the criteria to be used for 
determining standing to intervene at the administrative level. 119 Fur-
thermore, the functional difference between intervention in and 
judicial review of administrative processes suggests that different 
standing criteria should be adopted for the two procedures.60 Stand-
ing to intervene at the administrative level is granted primarily for 
informational purposes.61 For example, in the principal case, the 
court expanded standing so as to insure that the Commission would 
adequately. consider allegations of improper broadcasting practices. 
However, once a record has been compiled on the basis of an evi-
dentiary hearing, standing serves only a remedial purpose insofar 
as it secures a judicial review of the administrative determination. 62 
Thus, those petitioners whose claims were either not considered or 
were inadequately considered by the Commission should have stand-
ing to seek review. However, if a claim has been brought to the 
Commission's attention, and a hearing has been held on the merits, 
the petitioner should not have standing to seek review of the Com-
mission's determination, for the ultimate responsibility for apply-
ing the "public interest" standard to the facts adduced at the hear-
58. See note 18 supra; Brief for appellee, pp. 29-30. 
59. See note, 68 YALE L.J. 783, 789 (1959). 
60. Professor Davis has provided a useful summary of the distinctions: 
The central problem of intervention is usually the disadvantage to the tribunal 
and to other parties of extended cross-examination; judicial review involves no 
such problem. Adequate protection for interests obliquely affected may often 
be afforded through limited participation; no such compromise concerning 
judicial review is customary. No constitutional restrictions affect intervention; 
standing to obtain review is substantially affected by the constitutional require-
ment of a case or controversy. Intervention means mere participation in a 
proceeding already initiated by others; obtaining judicial review normally means 
instituting an entirely new judicial proceeding. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 406-07 (1959). 
The court gave no consideration to the possibility that a significant expansion of 
standing to secure judicial review might permit claims to be brought before the court 
which would fail to meet the requirements of a "case or controversy." In the context 
of "fairness doctrine" violations, however, the requisite adverse interest would probably 
be present, even though no economic injury, as such, exists. Cf. Scenic Hudson Pre-
servation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 
(1966). 
61. Such intervention serves a dual "informational" purpose. First, it places before 
the Commission evidence bearing on the licensee's past conduct and general fitness 
to be granted a license. Second, it brings to the attention of the agency interests of 
other licensees which might be adversely affected by a grant of the license. Hence it 
serves a preventive function as well as one purely informational, and thereby avoids 
subsequent need for the remedy of judicial review. 
62. DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 60, at 398; JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 522. 
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ing rests with the Commission.63 Indeed, it has been said that, under 
the broad standards governing FCC action, the "court is nearly 
powerless to invalidate [legitimately] a decision on substantitve 
grounds."64 Consequently, increasing access to the courts for a re-
view of a hearing on the merits would not, in most instances, pro-
mote the public interest, but rather would tend only to burden the 
courts with appeals raising issues which are more properly within 
the realm of the Commission's expertise. Therefore, it would seem 
unwise to expand the present standards for determining standing 
to secure a review if such an expansion were to include those who 
seek review of a Commission determination which is preceded by 
a hearing on the merits. 
Despite the foregoing objections, the court's approach to the 
problem of standing is a commendable one. But, liberalization 
of the criteria for standing before the Commission cannot alone as-
sure that the licensing procedures will adequately protect the public 
interest. Once a broadcaster has applied for a renewal of his license, 
the formal "petition to deny" is the normal vehicle for the expres-
sion of a complaint. Until such an application is filed, however, the 
informal "complaint" is the principal method of protest}35 Con-
sideration by the Commission of an informal "complaint" is, like 
its consideration of the "informal objection," completely discre-
tionary and does not afford a basis for an appeal. 66 In addition, 
even if allegations in a "complaint" raise a "material question of 
fact" as to whether a licensee's operations are consistent with the 
public interest, the Commission need not hold a hearing on a "com-
plaint" until an application for a license renewal is filed.67 Thus, a 
63. See American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 
Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
64. JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 521. 
65. Section 309(d) of the Communications Act provides only for the filing of a 
"petition to deny" an application already filed with the Commission. See 74 Stat. 889 
(1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(l) (1964). 
66. Informal or "general" complaints, filed pursuant to § 1.41 of the Commission's 
Rules and Regulations, can be dealt with in a variety of ways, ranging from a full 
investigation of the matter pursuant to § 1.1 of the Rules and Regulations to a 
simple answering letter. See Letter From l3en F. Waple, Secretary, FCC, to the Michigan 
Law Review, Feb. 28, 1966. See generally FCC, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in 
Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (1964). 
67. When a complaint is filed with the Commission, if it determines that sufficient 
facts are set forth to warrant further consideration, it will: 
promptly advise the licensee of the complaint and request the licensee's com• 
ments on the matter. Full opportunity is given to the licensee to set out all 
programs which he has presented, or plans to present, with respect to the issue 
in question during an appropriate time period. Unless additional information 
is sought from either the complainant or the licensee, the matter is then usually 
disposed of by Commission action. 
FCC, supra note 66, at 10416. The Commission may, of course, institute a proceeding 
under § 1.91 of its Rules and Regulations for the revocation or issue of a cease and 
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complainant may have to wait for as long as three years to present 
its evidence. In the principal case, over ten years elapsed between 
the filing of the initial complaints with the Commission and the 
final disposition of the matter in the court of appeals.08 Even then, 
there had been no hearing on the merits of the complaint. Clearly, 
a given view on a controversial issue will not always be represented 
by so durable an interest group as the one which issued the com-
plaint in the principal case (NAACP). An ad hoc citizens' commit-
tee, formed solely for the purpose of supporting a given piece of 
state legislation or advocating municipal attention to some local 
grievance, would have neither the stability nor possibly the interest 
to pursue a complaint before the FCC for even three years. Indeed, 
such a group might not even continue to exist, and consequently 
the renewal hearing, when it is finally held, would be of little 
assistance in ascertaining whether the licensee had operated in the 
public interest; with only the licensee and Commission as parties, 
the amount of information elicited at a hearing would not be sig-
nificantly greater than that elicited through less formal procedures. 
A possible remedy to this situation would be to adopt a proce-
dure whereby the Commission would be required to consider a 
complaint at the time it is filed, and if necessary, to hold an imme-
diate hearing on the specific issues raised by the complaint.69 Fur-
thermore, the Commission could be required to issue a formal 
memorandum, which would be judicially reviewable, whenever it 
is presented with a formal complaint. In the event that a com-
plainant's contentions are rejected, he could seek a judicial deter-
mination that, were an application for renewal pending at the time, 
his complaint would raise a "material question of fact" as to whether 
renewal of the license would be in the public interest. It is obvious 
that a procedure which required interim hearings whenever an 
issue of fact is raised would greatly increase the burden now 
placed on the agency, and consequently the Commission should be 
given considerable discretion as to when the hearing should be held. 
Certainly the prerequisites which must be satisfied before a com-
plainant is entitled to a hearing should be more stringent when the 
hearing is prior to the filing of a license renewal application than 
at renewal time, and the scheduling of a hearing should depend on 
desist order. 47 C.F.R. § 1.91 (1966). However, the Commission• would have to con-
sider a violation as an extremely serious one before such procedure would be under• 
taken. 
68. Principle case at 998. 
69. Section 1.1 of the Commission's Rules provides that: 
The Commission may on its own motion or petition of any interested party 
hold such proceedings as it may deem necessary from time to time in connection 
with the investigation of any matter which it has power to investigate. 
47 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1966). See also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.89, .91, .92, (1966). 
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the necessity of considering the information immediately. For in-
stance, a complaint of serious broadcaster misconduct brought by 
an ad hoc interest group would obviously be more in need of a 
prompt hearing than a protest brought by a local chapter of the 
NAACP. When such a special hearing is held, the Commission 
should also be allowed, in its discretion, to determine how best to 
employ its findings. First, the findings could be placed in the li-
censee's file (as is common in the case of informal "complaints" 
under the current procedure) to be considered at the time of license 
renewal. Second, the findings could be used to support an order by 
the Commission which reduces the station's license term to one 
year, necessitating evaluation of the licensee's conduct at the end 
of one year rather than the usual three. 70 Third, the findings could 
be used as the basis for a Commission order to the broadcaster to 
show cause why its license should not be revoked immediately.71 
Whichever of these procedures the Commission decides to adopt in 
a given case, it will have at its disposal, when the issue of renewal 
is raised, the information relevant to a proper determination of 
whether the license renewal would be in the public interest. 
70, See § 1.87 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 1.87 (1966), 
for procedures regarding the modification of a station license. 
71. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.89, .91, .92 (1966). 
